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**Applying the Francis and Hunston Model**  
**to Debate-like Spoken Discourse**

**1. Introduction**

This paper will apply Francis and Hunston's (1992) framework for analyzing everyday conversation to a professional interview with the purpose of examining the characteristics of debate-like discourse. It will be argued that the framework reveals the assertive nature of the discourse in general as well as more specific strategies used in argumentative situations. After that comment will be offered as to the issues involved in applying the framework to this specific genre of dialogue. Many issues remain to be resolved in the analysis of spoken discourse but refining the tools put forward so far will reveal a course forward.

**2. Part I. Analysis**

**2.1 Literature Review: The System of Analysis**

It will be assumed that the reader is familiar with the Francis and Hunston (1992) framework for analyzing everyday conversation but a brief review of the system and background will follow. The framework aims to add detail to the Coulthard and Montgomery (1981) propositions that modified fundamental elements of the original, more intricate framework laid out in Sinclair and Coulthard (1975).

Expanding on ideas like '*adjacency pairs*' (Sacks, n.d.), spoken discourse analysts begin with the idea that certain utterances predict or restrict those to follow and set out to define the structure of larger stretches of spoken language. Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) examining discourse within the classroom identify the elements of structure I R F (*Initiation, Response, and Follow-up*) realized respectively by the moves '*opening*', '*answering*', and '*follow-up*', and place these within a discourse rank-scale hierarchy based on Halliday's (1961) '*Categories of the theory of grammar*' moving from their largest category '*Lesson*' to the smallest '*Act*'. They identify and define in detail elements and classes within the ranks, and the constraints therein. Coulthard and Montgomery (1981) observing patterns in other types of data, notice that an exchange *Initiation* can either be an elicitation or a presentation of new information, and a *Response* can be an answer to an elicitation or an acknowledgement of information. They proposed abandoning the one-to-one correlation between elements of structure and

moves, re-labeling the moves realizing I R F as ‘*eliciting*’, ‘*informing*’ and ‘*acknowledging*’ and adding the possibility of an *informing* move at I or R, and an *acknowledging* move at R or F. (See Coulthard and Brazil (1992) for a more detailed explanation of this.) This new relationship of *Exchange* structure element to *Move* is illustrated below (Fig 1).




Figure 1. The reformed relationship between *Exchange* structure and *Moves*

As well, in order to more clearly define the boundaries of an exchange, I R F was extended to I (R/I) R (F<sup>n</sup>), R/I occurring occasionally, acting as both I and R in order to clarify or elicit a repeat of an utterance, and F being optional and possibly occurring more than once. Thus, only I and R then, are obligatory within all complete exchanges.

Building on this, and utilizing the Hallidayan rank-scale hierarchy, Francis and Hunston analyzed telephone conversations and other authentic data and set 5 levels to the rank-scale of spoken discourse as illustrated below (Fig. 2).




Figure 2. Francis and Hunston’s five ranks of spoken discourse.

The highest level on the rank, *Interaction* is hard to define but roughly is the speaking situation. Next, *Transaction* is the topic of conversation and is recognized by the structural element P (*Preliminary*) or by a high key proclaiming tone initiating an utterance. There are 2 major types of *Exchange*: *Organizational* and *Conversational* and within those, 6 sub-classes (2 *Organizational*, 4 *Conversational*). *Exchanges* are realized by the structural elements I, (I/R), R, and (F.) which are subsequently realized by the next level down on the rank, *Move* which possesses 8 sub-classes formed by the lowest level on the scale, *Act* of which there are 32 types and which structurally can be in one of three positions, *pre-head*, *head*, or *post-head*. Details of the restrictions of use of the various elements and where they can occur can be found in Francis and Hunston (Ibid) and indeed constitutes the main body of the work. Restrictions on where in an *Exchange* a *Move* can occur when R/I is considered are illustrated below (Fig. 3). The names of the various elements can be found with a summation of the data in appendix 2.




Figure 3. The restriction of *Moves* in *Exchanges* adding R/I

## 2.2 Source of Data

The data to be analyzed was selected from interviews featured on the independent daily news program ‘Democracy Now!’ airing on over 350 radio and TV stations in North America. On the show, hosts Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzales typically interview guests in studio or via video or sound conferencing. In this case it was a video feed, which interestingly from the point of view of the present analysis, minimized any communication expressed by body movement or facial expressions. Along with video files of the interviews, approximated transcripts are available for free from the production’s website as a resource, but the transcript required major reworking to be used for this type of analysis in order to adhere to the conventions used by Francis and Hunston. Aside from special typographical coding used by the researchers to indicate overlapping, the transcript lacked content such as back channel cues (e.g. ‘*Uh hum*’), the use of ‘*umm..*’ to fill space during a speaking turn, false starts leading into an utterance (e.g. ‘*ah, I, I, wanted to ask you a question.*’), uncompleted words, and slips of the tongue. The data was chosen at a point where there were frequent alternations of

speaker with appropriate beginning and ending points allowing for approximately 2500 words of dialogue. It covers 11 minutes and 17 seconds of the interview. The data sample coded with the Francis and Hunston system is included as appendix 1.

### **2.3 Analysis of the Data**

The analysis proceeds from large to small on the hierarchical rank scale. A summary of the numbers quoted in the analysis are attached in table form as appendix 2

#### **2.3.1 Interaction, Transaction**

Like Francis and Hunston's data sample, (Francis & Hunston, 1992:157-161). the entire data sample takes place within the two highest units on the rank scale, *interaction* and *transaction*. The '*interaction*' in this case comprises an interview of co-authors New York Times correspondent Michael Gordon and retired U.S. General Bernard Trainor concerning their new book about the war in Iraq, 'Cobra II'. The *boundary transactions* preceding the onset of the interview would support this but not necessarily define it (ibid. 141). The '*transaction*' starts when the interviewer, Amy Goodman changes the topic from the new book and the war in general, to interviewee Michael Gordon's activities as a journalist leading up to the invasion as, "the transaction is basically a *topic-unit*." (ibid. 140). The data sample begins at the point where the topic is changed, but does not continue entirely to the end for reasons of space.

#### **2.3.2 Exchanges**

There were a total of 23 exchanges in the data. Although the data was chosen to have frequent alternations of speakers, this was a relatively low number of exchanges considering the amount of data. This is due to the 'interview' nature of the situation characterized by long '*Elicit*' and '*Inform*' exchanges.

'*Inform*' was the most frequent type of exchange with a total of 12 exchanges comprising 64 percent of the data in terms of words, 1.9 times more than the next most frequent exchange '*Elicit*' which with 8 exchanges covered 34 percent of the words in the data. The remaining 3 exchanges (2 percent of the words) were '*Direct*' orders to relinquish the floor realized by move heads like " *Let me make my point and then you could answer it*" (line 118).

The lack of other types of exchanges could be a result of the static and stable nature of the situation; two persons seated in separate TV studios with no problem hearing each other, but more interesting is the dominance of '*Inform*' over '*Elicit*' as it would be thought that an interview would primarily consist of '*Elicit*' exchanges where the

interviewer would ask questions of the interviewee triggering long *informing* moves at R. However more characteristic was either the interviewer and interviewee initiating an ‘*Inform*’ to introduce information that contrasted something that the other party had introduced before.

As the interview became more of a debate, one interesting strategy was revealed by the exchange structure. It seemed that both parties preferred to be the initiator of the exchange even if it meant deviating from a preferred response or leaving an exchange incomplete. Related to this were the numerous interruptions attempting successfully or not to take the floor (lines 10, 11, 13, 16, 30, 33, 36, 41, 76, 116, 136, 270, 294, 299, 302, 311, 313, 315) but these were of a different nature. Twice, at an appropriate starting point for an ‘R’ move, rather than respond at R the interviewee initiated a new exchange saying something like “*Are you going to let me talk now?*” (line 154). The interviewer would then again re-initiate directing the interviewee to ‘respond’ (line 154,233) apparently also refusing to be at R and thus leaving the interviewee’s exchange incomplete. This happened once at line 154 (Example 1below), and once at line 233.

### Example 1: Battling for Exchange Initiation

<i>Line of dialogue</i>	<i>act</i>	<i>e.s.</i>	<i>move</i>	<i>e.s</i>	<i>exchange</i>
150. A:some well into the night. In the end, nobody					
151. was quoted questioning the C.I.A.'s position,					
152. as I would have expected. He says.					
153. M: Ø	(rec)	h	(Acknowledging)	R	
154. M: Are you going to let me talk now?	n,pr	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit (inc)
155. A: If you could respond to that, please.	inq	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit
156. M: Yeah.	rec	pre-h	Informing	R	
157. M: You're not well-informed on this issue,	i	h			

It could be construed that the interviewee wanted to continue a point he had failed to insert earlier rather than respond to the topic at hand, but the utterances following didn’t do so. It also could be interpreted that the interviewer wanted to make sure the interviewee didn’t veer off the subject in such a way, but in a previous similar exchange (line 76) the interviewer had allowed the interviewee’s re-initiation tactic without witnessing such deviant subject shifting on the part of the interviewee. It is therefore plausible that the interviewee’s intentions were to, in a manner, clear the way and appear to be on the offensive at I of a new exchange rather than at a defensive R even though what he would say would be the same. The interviewer didn’t allow this simply

in order to retain the upper hand role of ‘interviewer’. These exchange re-initiation tactics seemed only to serve the needs of a power struggle within the interaction.

### 2.3.3 Moves

There were a total of 48 moves in the data. Examining the types found also reveals the argumentative nature of the interview. Compared to 8 *Eliciting* moves there were 17 *Informing*, again suggesting that the participants were more interested in asserting information than asking and answering questions in a more cooperative discourse. Of a total of 19 *Acknowledging* moves, 9 were realized by the act ‘*protest*’ (line 16, 33, 35, 116, 266, 299, 311, 313, 315) when the listener disagreed with what was being said, and 6 were the special implied ‘*receive*’ act that is coded before a new exchange for lack of a predicted R in an *Inform* exchange (ibid.154-5). Of these, three (line 29, 112, 293) were before a new *Inform* introducing contrasting information as in example 40 of Francis and Hunston (ibid), two (line 75,153) were before an *Elicit* exchange like the “*Are you going to let me talk now?*” mentioned before, and one (line 135) was before a *Direct* exchange realized by the head “*&Let me just quote&*”. Lowest in frequency were three sets of *Directing* and *Behaving* moves of the aforementioned ‘*Let me talk!*’ nature.

### 2.3.4 Acts

There were a total of 67 acts. The most numerous type was *informative* with a total of 14. Of those, only 5 were at R (line 4, 14, 77, 157, 237), and of those, only 3 were yes/no answers. This again illustrates a tendency for interjecting information in a debate. There were 10 *starters* and 3 of these (line 11, 37, 303) were of a hostile nature from the interviewee, for example “*Excuse me! Excuse me! I let you talk. You should let me talk!*” (line 303). This is very similar to the exchange re-initiation technique mentioned earlier. The interviewer on the other hand tended to use the *starter* to assert the factuality of the following utterance, for example, “*Well, Let me quote the Times*” (line 43). Also at a count of 10 was *receive*, but it is worth mentioning that 6 of these were of the implied *Acknowledgement* move found in Example 1 above so were not vocalized.

Next in terms of frequency were the 9 instances of *protest* mentioned earlier, which need no further elaboration here. More interesting perhaps, is the observation of 6 *engage* acts, more commonly known as ‘back channel cues’ or ‘feedback’ (Yngve, 1970). These were all vocalized as “*Uh hum*” from the interviewee and interestingly none of them came from the interviewer. An plausible interpretation of these, while perhaps also being a prelude to a bid for a speaking turn, is that perhaps they meant to

express “*Yes, I already know all this.*” reinstating the interviewee as the ‘primary knower’ (Berry, 1981) in an attempt to gain footing in preparation for a defensive response. It is interesting to further speculate that the interviewer’s lack of back channel cues reserves her offensive role. She is familiar with, and has already predicted to a point the argument the interviewee will put forth and doesn’t want to validate it by *engaging*. Contrary to this idea however, is the fact that upon examining other interviews done by this interviewer, it was found that as a matter of course, she doesn’t back channel when the interviewee is speaking, perhaps in order to give the stage, and of course knowledge ownership solely to the interviewee as a matter of politeness. This may be true also of most interviewers or even in a broader sense, most listeners when a speaker is presenting new, ‘speaker-owned’ information. It could be said then that the interviewer’s lack of *engage* was a matter of politeness but that the interviewee’s repetitive use of it contrary to the fact that the interviewer was presenting new ‘interviewer-owned’ information was both an usurpation of primary knower status, and also a parting with such manners in preparation to launch a defensive attack. The use of *engage* in interviewing situations could be an interesting topic for further research,

Occurring only once, but indicative of a debate was the *terminate* at line 36 identified by its being low key. Having asserted something and having it refuted, the interviewee was trying to counter that again and shut the interviewer down claiming closure by ending the exchange with low key.

There were various other acts of low frequency which will not be mentioned individually but as a final note it was noticed that there were only 5 *neutral proposals* and 2 *inquires* in producing the 14 informative acts again illustrating the assertive nature of the discourse.

### **2.3.5 Summary of Analysis**

Using Francis and Hunston’s rank scale framework for analyzing spoken discourse brought to light several characteristics of the debate-like nature of the sampled data. Among these characteristics were the numerous self-initiated *Inform* exchanges, techniques for re-initiating exchanges to turn the table and become the initiator, Using *Direct* exchanges to usurp the floor, interrupting utterances with an *Acknowledge* move realized by the act *protest*, using the pre-head *starter* to assert the factuality of a following utterance (the interviewer) or to complain that one hadn’t been given the chance earlier to say what would follow (the interviewee), and the use of *engage* back channel cues to reassert primary knower status. There were however several issues involved with fitting the data into Francis and Hunston’s framework, which will be

commented on in part II of this paper.

### 3. Part II. Comment

#### 3.1 Introduction to Comment

While Francis and Hunston's (1992) framework proved to be a powerful tool in revealing patterns in the data and the characteristics and strategies of this type of discourse, there were many issues involved in fitting the data into it. First and foremost, because of the debate-like nature of the interview there was a tendency for each speaker to simply react to an exchange initiating *Informing* move at I, with another *Informing* move. This happened often and presented difficulty in the encoding process. Secondly, interpreting the discourse functions of the utterances presented problems. Thirdly, the relationships between acts made by the same speaker were left unexamined if they crossed an exchange. And finally, long utterances were largely left unexamined by the framework.

#### 3.2 Informs as Responses to Informs

Inherent in the I (R/I) R (F) framework is the assumption that R is predicted by I. In other words R is obligatory and an exchange lacking an R is incomplete. This would seem true if I were a simple question and R were its answer. A question unanswered is certainly an incomplete exchange. However in the data it often occurred that an *informative* act as *head* of an *Informing* move at I of an *Inform* exchange would be countered by another *Informative* move realized by an *informative* act as *head*. A summarized version of the conversation surrounding line 113 would look like this:

*M: I didn't write that in the article because the dissenters didn't come forward with their opinions at the time.*

*A: They say they did in this quote...(continues on to cite a newspaper article at length)*

These are both *informing* moves realized by *informative* acts and obviously are related in the discourse, the second line being a response to the first. They should be part of the same exchange but the system doesn't allow this because it would cause problems defining the borders of an exchange. Francis and Hunston (1992) state that in order to have definable limits to an exchange, "if there are two eliciting or two informing moves in one exchange, their heads must be realized by different acts"(ibid: 144).



Compounding this, the definition of an *informative* act states it shall be found at R of an *Elicit* exchange or I of an *Inform* exchange (ibid. 131) so, an *informative* act cannot be at R of an *Inform* exchange or occur as the head of two *informing* moves within the same exchange. Francis and Hunston say that if these conditions aren't met the exchange is to be coded as incomplete but this seemed an unacceptable solution for the data analyzed in this study. An alternative act to describe these *Informing* moves was looked for in Francis and Hunston's framework but none matched. The act *protest* seemed close but it cannot realize an *informing* move (Ibid. 127) and is defined as "yes, no and their variants" (133) however the same definition says, "it acknowledges the utterance while disputing its correctness, relevance, ...or anything else". For this reason the act *protest* was used at R or F when the utterance directly "disputed correctness" even if it wasn't a yes or no, as in this summarized version of the data surrounding line 299:

*M: I actually did write that the IAEA challenged the fact that aluminum tubes were to be used for nuclear weapons.*

*A: Many months later!*

However, extending *protest* didn't capture the idea of a more lengthy presentation of information in response to, and contradicting a previous *informative* utterance as in the case of the citing of the newspaper quote mentioned earlier (around line 113). In these cases, Francis and Hunston's 'implied' *Acknowledging* move realized by a *receive* act was used as in the examples in their work (Examples 40-42, Ibid. 154-5). To an extent, they seemed to match. The idea of a silent (thus 'implied') *Acknowledging* move is that the listener is present, and has heard and processed the speaker's utterance, and thus *receives* it though says nothing. This is coded as R and so the listener reacting to it starts a new exchange without breaking the rule of an obligatory R predicted by I. This technique is useful in that it allows the hierarchical system to remain in tact, but it seems that implied *Acknowledging* moves could be coded at any number of places in the data and are in fact omnipresent assuming the listener is being attentive. Francis and Hunston account for this arguing that "[t]he unrealized elements are 'understood' *if and only if* what follows in the discourse is consistent with that interpretation". In any case, while coding the data within an *Inform* exchange, it was quite difficult to decide whether to stretch the definition of *protest*, or use the implied *Acknowledging* move, the later of which denies the relationship of the two utterances in terms of exchange. One method suggested by Francis and Hunston (1992:156) to deal with difficulties such as

those previously described is to create new acts that describe utterances particular to a type of discourse. I would like to propose a new act that would allow utterances such as those described to exist within the same exchange. A definition could look something like this:

**add-informative a-i**

Realized by information that adds to, contrasts, or contradicts information in a preceding utterance. Realizes the head of an Informing move as a special type of I/R.

Its function is to supply information that adds to, changes, or challenges information of a preceding utterance.

**3.3 Interpreting Illocutionary Acts**

While coming to terms with the system was the most difficult task in deciding where to divide exchanges, the most laborious part of fitting the data to the framework was deciding which discourse functions each utterance realized. The difficulties encountered are too numerous to mention individually but commenting on a few examples may be illustrative.

One such problem was at line 30. The data is as follows (Example 2).

**Example 2. Interpreting utterances**

30. A: & Michael Gordon, let me	s	pre-h	Informing	I	Inform	4
31. just respond. We don't – we, we have limited time	i	h				
32. in the program, but I just &						
33. M: & Well, then you should let me	prot	h	Acknowledging	R		
34. answer your questions.&						
35. A: &I did.&	prot	h	Acknowledge	F		
36. M: &No, you haven't	ter	h				

The verb 'let' in the imperative mood (*let me...*) would seem to indicate the act *directive* realizing a *Directing* move in a *Direct* exchange. The response "Well, then you should let me answer your questions" would be a *reject* act realizing the pre-head of a *Behaving* move. However, the response addresses "we have limited time" as information presented by A and protests her right to have uttered it. Therefore "we have limited time" was coded as the head of an *Informing* move and an *informative* act. This use of 'let me' was found several times in the data and was coded in various ways

according to what followed.

In a similar way, at line 12, “*Can I answer your question, since you asked me a question?*” could easily be paraphrased as “*Let me talk!*” again a directive, but the response was “*Well, no.*” treating it (perhaps slightly ironically) in its literal sense, as a *neutral proposal* and thus was coded as such. This happened again but without the need to consider a paraphrase. “*If you could respond to that, please.*” (line 155), in terms of form seems to be a *directive* act; “*respond please*” being a request for action, but Francis and Hunston’s definition of directive specifies that it is a request for a non-verbal response, so ‘*respond*’ even in imperative mood would not match the criteria. It realizes an *inquire* and was coded as such. Often however, utterances requesting that the other party cease talking, or allow the speaker to interject were taken as a request for a non-verbal response and because of that were coded as *directive*.

Line 36 also mentioned in the analysis, seemed like a *protest* in that it “dispute(s) correctness” (Ibid. 133) but the fact that it was low-key identified it as a *terminate*.

### **3.4 A Rank Between Exchange and Transaction.**

While this did not pose problems in terms of coding once the system was internalized, it was noticed that the relationship of utterances made by the same speaker was often not captured by the system. This relates back to the system’s need to delineate exchanges as mentioned earlier. One clear example happens at line 137. A’s “*Let me just quote...*” is followed by the response “*OK*” by M after which A goes on to recite at some length an outside source. In Francis and Hunston’s system “*Let me just quote*” followed by “*OK*” is one exchange, and the actual quote initiates a new one. However, if adjacent, “*Let me just quote*” would be a *pre-head* to the *informative* move of citing the quote making the relationship clear but as it stands they are separated and no such relationship is illustrated. In the same way much of what M had to say throughout the entire discourse if said continuously would be seen as *post-head* comment to the *informative* act “*No, I’m not.*” (line 4) in response to “*Are you sorry that you did this piece?*” (line 2). It may be that adding one more overarching rank to the scale somewhere between exchange and transaction would resolve such issues but limitations to analytic devices are inevitable. Like its predecessors, Francis and Hunston’s framework primarily focuses on the nature of *exchange*.

### **3.5 Long Utterances**

Along the same lines but lower in the rank scale, long utterances are left almost unexamined by the system. The debate-like nature of the data sampled and interviews

in general often produce long almost monologue-like uninterrupted chains of spoken language, which need to be dissected within the rank-scale hierarchy. Descriptions of stages in long speaking turns or the interpersonal affect certain ways of speaking such as is reviewed in Eggins and Slade (1997) could be of use. More specifically descriptions of monologue such as those in Brazil (1995) or Coulthard and Montgomery (1981) could contribute moves like *paraphrase*, *exemplifier*, or *repetition* to the framework helping it describe more fully these types of utterances however, it can be seen how this could complicate things to an unacceptable level unless they are to be used only in the case of long utterances or monologues as they are in practice.

#### **4. Conclusion**

Most of the problems encountered in fitting the data to the system can be attributed to its genre and the fact that it differs with the data behind Francis and Hunston's work. The framework did however prove to be powerful and was successful at pinpointing characteristics of the data and even perhaps the genre represented within. It can be seen that a viable path to push spoken discourse analysis forward is to expand on Francis and Hunston's theoretical apparatus. In doing so, it would be necessary to identify genres of interaction and work out specialized sets of acts, moves, and perhaps even ranks in the scale to describe them while determining which of such entities are more or less core and universal to all genres of spoken discourse. These tools can then be turned back on data representative of the genre to reveal its characteristics in specific terms as this paper has done.

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**Appendix 1:** Excerpt from independent news program “Democracy Now!”

Total time 11 minutes 17 seconds (39:10- 51:27)

Key to symbols:

(#)= pause

& = interrupted, interrupting, or overlapping start or finish

(inc)=incomplete exchange

<i>Line of dialogue</i>	<i>act</i>	<i>e.s.</i>	<i>move</i>	<i>e.s.</i>	<i>exch</i>	<i>ex</i>	<i>tr</i>
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Before this point, New York Times reporter and author Michael Gordon (**M**) is recalling events preceding the invasion of Iraq to ‘Democracy Now!’ interviewer Amy Goodman (**A**).

1. <b>A:</b> Let me just ask something on that.	s	pre-h	Eliciting	I	Elicit	1	1
2. Are you sorry you did the piece? Are you sorry that	n.pr	h					
3. this piece &	i	h	Informing	R			
4. <b>M:</b> & No, I’m not.	com	post-h					
5. I mean, what – I don’t know if you understand							
6. how journalism works, but the way journalism							
7. works is you write what you know, and what you							
8. know at the time you try to convey as best you can,							
9. but then you don’t stop reporting.							

10. <b>A:</b> Well, let me, let me &	s	h	(uncodable) Eliciting	I	Elicit	2	
11. <b>M:</b> & Can I answer your question, 12. since you asked me a question?	m i	s h	Informing	R			
13. <b>A:</b> & Well, 14. no, 15. I wanted to get –&	prot s	pre-h	(uncodable) Acknowledging Informing	F I	Inform	3	
16. <b>M:</b> & No, wait a second, 17. if you ask me a question 18. – I'm happy to answer all your questions, 19. but what I'm trying to explain to you is one thing. 20. That was what I knew at the time. It's true that it was 21. the key judgment. It's the same information they 22. presented to Colin Powell, by the way, and it's what 23. persuaded him to go to the United Nations and make 24. the case on the nuclear tubes. I wrote the contrary case, 25. giving the IAEA equal time. They disputed it. I don't 26. have a dog in this fight. I didn't know what was the 27. ultimate truth. When the IAEA came out in January 28. and disputed it, I reported it.&	i	h		R	Inform	4	
29. <b>A:</b> Ø 30. <b>A:</b> & Michael Gordon, let me just respond.	(rec) s	h pre-h	(Acknowledging) Informing	I	Inform	4	

31. We don't – we, we have limited time	i	h				
32. in the program, but I just &						
33. M: & Well, then you should let me	prot	h	Acknowledging	R		
34. answer your questions.&						
35. A: & I did.&	prot	h	Acknowledging	F		
36. M: & No, you haven't	ter	h	Acknowledging	F		
37. let me answer your question.&	s	pre-h	Informing	I	Inform(inc)	5
38. A: & Are you sorry then, that the New	n.pr	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit	6
39. York Times was sorry that this piece appeared as it						
40. did on the front page of the New York Times.&						
41. M: & I don't think "sorry" is	rej	h	Acknowledging	R		
42. the word the New York Times used.						
43. A: Well, let me quote the Times.	s	pre-h	Informing	I	Inform	7
44. In their piece that they wrote to the readers,	i	h				
45. that said, "From the Editors, the Times in Iraq,"						
46. that many referred to as the mea culpa of the Times,						
47. they said, "On September 8, 2002, the lead article of						
48. the paper was headlined, 'U.S. Says Hussein						
49. Intensified Quest for A-Bomb Parts.' That						
50. report concerned the aluminum tubes						
51. that the administration advertised insistently as						



<p>52. components for the manufacture of nuclear weapons</p> <p>53. fuel. The claim came not from defectors but from</p> <p>54. the best intelligence sources available at the time.</p> <p>55. Still, it should have been presented more cautiously.</p> <p>56. There were hints that the usefulness of the tubes in</p> <p>57. making nuclear fuel was not a sure thing, but the</p> <p>58. hints were buried deep, 1,700 words into a 3,600-word</p> <p>59. article, administration officials were allowed to hold</p> <p>60. forth at length on why this evidence of Iraq's nuclear</p> <p>61. intentions demanded that Saddam Hussein be dislodged</p> <p>62. from power. 'The first signs of a smoking gun,' they</p> <p>63. argue, 'may be a mushroom cloud.' Five days later,</p> <p>64. the Times reporters learned the tubes were in fact a</p> <p>65. subject of debate among intelligence agencies, the</p> <p>66. misgivings appeared deep in an article on page A-13,</p> <p>67. under a headline that gave no inkling that we were</p> <p>68. revising our earlier view. The headline was, 'White</p> <p>69. House Lists Iraq's Steps to Build Banned Weapons.'</p> <p>70. The Times gave voice to skeptics of the tubes on</p> <p>71. January 9, when the key piece of evidence was</p> <p>72. challenged by the International Atomic Energy Agency.</p>							
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73. That challenge was reported on page A-10. It might						
74. well have belonged on A-1.” (inaudible)&						
75. M: Ø	(rec)	h	(Acknowledging)	R		
76. M: &Can I answer your question?	n.pr	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit	8
77. A: Yes.	i	h	Informing	R		
78. M: Okay. I'm the person that wrote	i	h	Informing	I	Inform	9
79. the IAEA story when they challenged it. I'm the person						
80. that suggested the New York Times cover it. I wrote it						
81. twice. The second time I wrote it with a reporter						
82. named Jim Risen, who you may have heard of. So I've						
83. worked with a lot of different people. This issue, this						
84. debate as to whether these tubes were intended for						
85. nuclear purposes, was presented in a public forum in the						
86. United Nations well before the invasion, so everybody						
87. knew, the Congress, the American public, anyone who						
88. paid any attention to this, knew there was a debate.						
89. In fact, Colin Powell, in his presentation, acknowledged						
90. there was a debate within –uh, among experts about						
91. the utility of the tube. The uranium is a very different						
92. issue. That's something that emerged after the war.						
93. Anybody who didn't know that there was a debate						

<p>94. about the utility of the tubes, whether they were for  95. nuclear purposes or for merely rockets, simply wasn't  96. paying attention to the debate. This was all ventilated  97. before the war. Had I had perfect information, and had  98. I had -- many of these experts who have now, after the  99. war, like Joe Wilson, decided to share their reservations  100. with us. Had they shared all of this with us at the  101. time, I would have happily put in more caveats and  102. dissenting views, but the dissenters were  103. not dissenting to the New York Times at  104. the time. But as soon as the  105. IAEA went public with its assessment, I  106. covered it, and  107. by the way, if you know how newspapers work, I  108. actually don't decide what goes on the front page of  109. the New York Times, and I think the New York Times  110. did its best, you know, and had no agenda certainly in  111. this issue, in trying to cover this issue.  112. A; Ø  113. A: The dissenters themselves  114. disagree, and they say they did contact the New York</p>	(rec) i	h h	Acknowledging Informing	R I	Inform	10
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115. Times. For example &	prot	h	Acknowledging	R		
116. M: & No, I'm sorry, that's	d	h	Directing	I	Direct	11
117. not true.&	rec	pre-h	Behaving	R		
118. A: &Let me make my point,	be	h	Informing	I	Inform	12
119. and then you could answer it.&	s	pre-h				
120. M: & Okay.	i	h				
121. M < gives floor to Amy>						
122. A: & For example,						
123. David Albright, who is the U.N. weapons						
124. inspector; and I am quoting from Michael						
125. Massing's letter to the editor; responding to your						
126. objection to his piece in the New York Review of						
127. Books. Um, Albright writing, ah, that the Times'						
128. September 13story, which you also co-authored						
129. with Judith Miller.&						
130. M: &Uh um&	(eng)					
131. A:&was heavily slanted to the C.I.A.'s position,						
132. and the views of the other side were trivialized.						
133. Albright says— and this is the man who contacted						
134. the Times.&						
135. M: Ø	(rec)	H	(Acknowledging)	R		

136. <b>M:</b> &Can I%			(Uncodable)			
137. <b>A:</b> &Let me just quote&	d	h	Directing	I	Direct	13
138. <b>M:</b> &OK&	rec	pre-h	Behaving	R		
139. <b>M:</b> <stops talking>	be	h				
140. &for our audience, this is Albright	i	h	Informing	I	Inform	14
141. saying, “An administration official was quoted as						
142. saying that the best technical experts and nuclear						
143. scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the						
144. C.I.A. assessment.						
145. <b>M:</b> Uh hum.	(eng)					
146. <b>A:</b> These inaccuracies made their way						
147. into the story, despite several discussions that I had						
148. with Miller on the day before the story appeared,						
149. <b>M:</b> Uh hum	(eng)					
150. <b>A:</b> some well into the night. In the end, nobody						
151. was quoted questioning the C.I.A.'s position,						
152. as I would have expected. He says.						
153. <b>M:</b> Ø	(rec)	h	(Acknowledging)	R		
154. <b>M:</b> Are you going to let me talk now?	n.pr	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit (inc)	15
155. <b>A:</b> If you could respond to that, please.	inq	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit	16
156. <b>M:</b> Yeah.	rec	pre-h	Informing	R		

<p>157. <b>M:</b> You're not well-informed on this issue,  158. because – I don't have any, you know,  159. criticism of you as an individual, but you're not very  160. well informed on this, because if you were  161. well-informed on this – I'm friends with David  162. Albright. I think David Albright's an  163. upstanding person who is doing very good work.  164. I'm actually not Judy Miller, so I'm not the person  165. he had the conversation with, but David certainly  166. took the view early on, and he deserves a lot of  167. credit for this, that the aluminum tubes were  168. not intended for nuclear purposes. That's  169. absolutely true, and as a person outside government,  170. he did that analysis. However, and this is a  171. very important point for you and your viewers  172. to keep in mind, David Albright, at the very same  173. time he made this analysis, believed Iraq was  174. probably pursuing nuclear weapons, and at  175. the very same time that David Albright  176. challenged the tubes, he published a paper on his  177. website, saying there was a suspect site at Al-Khaim</p>	i	h			
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178. in western Iraq, that could possibly be involved in						
179. the processing of uranium for nuclear weapons						
180. purposes. And I've talked to David about this. David's						
181. view is an interesting view, and it was a technical						
182. view. David believes Saddam was interested in						
183. nuclear weapons, and he might very well be						
184. pursuing them. However,						
185. David did not believe that the aluminum tubes were						
186. for that purpose. That's David Albright's view, and						
187. what people like Michael Massing and, unfortunately,						
188. you have done now is you've cherry-picked David						
189. Albright's view to make it look like it was clear to						
190. him that Saddam ,uh, was not involved in nuclear						
191. purposes. David's view is very much like the British						
192. government. The British government believes the						
193. tubes were not for nuclear purposes. But they took the						
194. position that Saddam was reviving his						
195. nuclear weapons program. So it was a complicated						
196. series of events to be sure, and – but it's						
197. important to – a lot of people in hindsight ,						
198. ya, y'know, reflect on -- see their position as						

199. different than it was at the time.	i	h	Informing	I	Inform	17	
200. A: But the tubes were key, and							
201. what was so important too was the timing. Vice							
202. President Cheney, of course, having The New York							
203. Times in front of him, saying: "If you don't believe							
204. what I say, refer to The New York Times today." But							
205. going on with Massing's piece, referring to Albright,							
206. who did not believe that the tubes were being used for							
207. this, though the Times did assert this,							
208. M: Uh hum	(eng)						
209. Albright goes							
210. on to note that he wrote a series of reports criticizing							
211. the administration's claims about the tubes and its							
212. misuse of information to build a case for war and that							
213. these became the basis for an article in							
214. The Washington Post							
215. M: Uh hum	(eng)						
216. on September 19th, 2002, that disclosed the &							
217. M: & Inside the paper. &	ref	h	Acknowledging	R			
218. A: & doubts some experts had about							
219. the tubes' suitability for use in centrifuges&.							



220. <b>M:</b> &Uh hum&	(eng)					
221. <b>A:&amp;A</b> s Albright goes on to note, the Times's						
222. September 13th article, by carrying the categorical						
223. deni... dismissal by senior officials of the						
224. dissenters' views, made these dissenters nervous						
225. about discussing the issue further.						
226. By contrast, reporters at Knight Ridder newspapers,						
227. after writing about the dissent in the intelligence						
228. community, began receiving calls from sources eager						
229. to talk. Thus the Times heavy reliance on official						
230. sources and its dismissal of other sources may have						
231. discouraged potential dissenters from discussing their						
232. views with its reporters.						
233. <b>M:</b> Do you want me to	n.pr	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit (inc)	18
234. say something?&						
235. <b>A:</b> &Your response, please.	inq	h	Eliciting	I	Elicit	19
236. <b>M:</b> Yeah, I don't agree with that.	s	pre-h	Informing	R		
237. And I actually—in the months of, you know,	i	h				
238. November, December, I actually wasn't in the United						
239. States, I was out in—spent most of time						
240. actually in the, you know, Arabian Peninsula						

241. area covering military developments,						
242. so I wasn't always present when all						
243. these things were unfolding. I don't agree that this						
244. discouraged them. I think these people never came						
245. forward. They came forward after—you know, at both						
246. after the war, the Washington Post did an excellent job						
247. and so did The New York Times of unraveling the						
248. tubes issue in great detail, talking to						
249. people who weren't making themselves						
250. available at the time. But I'm						
251. going to make just one—and I think you can beat this						
252. dead horse forever, but I think I'm going to make one						
253. point. I, the same guy that wrote that story, wrote an						
254. article -- two articles in early 2003, that said						
255. Mohamed El Baradei, the State Department's Bureau						
256. of Intelligence, the British Government, and the						
257. Energy Department, all (#) disagreed with						
258. the dominant view of the C.I.A. that the tubes						
259. were for that purpose. And I wrote that						
260. on one occasion, under my						
261. own name, and another occasion, in a co-authored						

262. piece with Jim Risen. And these articles, if memory						
263. serves, appeared in the January-February timeframe.						
264. So, I mean, you can go check it on the public record,						
265. and it's all there.						
266. A: The public record often shows	prot	h	Acknowledging	F		
267. this, but what isn't emphasized is where it appears in						
268. the paper. That was on page A9, page 10—much						
269. shorter article. And in fact,						
270. M:(inaudible)			(Uncodable)			
271. A: Let me make a point,	d		Directing	I	Direct	20
272. M: &Go ahead&	rec	pre-h	Behaving	R		
273. M:<remains quiet>	be	h				
274. A:&on that weekend that your first piece appeared&	i	h	Informing	I	Inform	21
275. M: &Uh Hmm&	(eng)					
276. A:&September 8th, that was the weekend that British						
277. Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush were						
278. at Camp David, um, and they talked about an IAE						
279. report that showed new information						
280. M:&Uh humm&	(eng)					
281. A: &about the concern of Saddam Hussein						
282. getting weapons &						

283. M: &Uh hum&	(eng)				
284. A: & of, ah , ah, mass destruction, particularly nuclear					
285. weapons. In fact, President Bush said, &					
286. M: &Uh hum&	(eng)				
287. A: &“I don't know what more evidence we need.”					
288. M:&Uh hum&	(eng)				
289. A: &Well, actually, any evidence would have					
290. helped. There was no such IAEA report, but few					
291. mainstream American journalists, including the Times					
292. at the time, questioned the leaders' outright lies.					
293. M: Ø					
294. M: Can I um (#)	(rec)	h	(acknowledging)	R	
295. – I never wrote the	s	h	Informing	I	Inform
296. IAEA -- I wrote the exact opposite. I wrote that the	i				22
297. IAEA challenged it, I didn't say the IAEA supported it.					
298. But I wanted—&					
299. A: & Many months later:	prot	h	Acknowledging	R	
300. That's January. I'm talking September at					
301. the time of your piece coming out.&					
302. M: & I, I, couldn't			(uncodable)		
303. Excuse me. Excuse me,	s	pre-h	Informing	I	Inform
					23

304. I let you talk, you should						
305. let me talk.						
306. I wrote the IAEA assessment	i	h				
307. when -- as soon as the IAEA made						
308. its public assessment. You know, I couldn't						
309. write what the IAEA's assessment was before						
310. they made it.&						
311. A: & But you could have challenged	prot	h	Acknowledging	R		
312. President Bush at the White House &						
313. M: & I wasn't at. I wasn't at the	prot	h	Acknowledging	F		
314. White House, I'm sorry, I wasn't at the -- can I --&						
315. A: & The article, the Times could	prot	h	Acknowledging	F		
316. have challenged President Bush and Tony						
317. Blair, saying that a new IAEA report had showed						
318. that Iraq was six months away from building						
319. nuclear weapons, when in fact it						
320. didn't come out with such a report. And instead, the						
321. Times came out with a front-page piece that very						
322. weekend, which was yours, talking about Saddam						
323. Hussein getting nuclear weapons, the aluminum tubes.						

Continued...

## Appendix 2: Summary of Data from Analysis

### 1. Acts

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Act Name</i>	<i>Occurrence</i>
fr	framer	
m	marker	1
s	starter	10
ms	meta-statement	
con	conclusion	
acq	acquiesce	
gr	greeting	
re-gr	reply-greeting	
sum	summons	
re-sum	reply-summons	
inq	inquire	2
n.pr	neutral proposal	5
m.pr	marked proposal	
ret	return	
l	loop	
p	prompt	
obs	observation	
i	informative	14
conc	concur	
conf	confirm	
qu	qualify	
rej	reject	1
ter	terminate	1
rec	receive	10
rea	react	
ref	reformulate	1
end	endorse	
prot	protest	9
d	directive	3
be	behave	3
com	comment	1
eng	engage	6

## 2. Moves

<i>Moves</i>	<i>Occurrence</i>			
Framing				
Opening				
Answering				
Eliciting	8			
Informing	16			
Acknowledging	19	(9 protests)	(6 implied recs)	(4 others)
Directing	3			
Behaving	3			

## 3. Exchanges

<i>Exchanges</i>			
<i>Organizational</i>	boundary structuring (greet) (summon)		
<i>Conversational</i>	Elicit	8	
	Inform	12	
	Direct	3	
	Clarify		
(bound elicit)	Repeat		
(bound elicit)	Re-initiation		

## 4 Higher levels

<i>Transaction</i>	>1
<i>Interaction</i>	>1